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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to calculate a value for the return on 
investment (ROI) of the Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services 
(CANES).  The research examines previous work performed by the CANES team 
in the development of a business case for CANES.  This thesis also discusses 
some of the intangible benefits of CANES and difference between cost savings 
and cost avoidance. 
The thesis focuses on quantifying the possible benefits of upgrading the 
current shipboard network system to the CANES system, and determining 
whether those benefits are likely to be realized in actual operations. 
The researcher calculated a CANES ROI of 73 percent.  A sensitivity 
analysis was performed to examine how ignoring cost avoidance affects the 
calculated value of ROI, along with how much other input factors would have to 
change in order to make the CANES investment unattractive. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The purpose of this thesis is to calculate a value for the return on 
investment (ROI) of the Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services 
(CANES).  CANES is the next generation of computer networks for U.S. Navy 
ships, which is meant to replace the aging system of networks currently deployed 
throughout the fleet.  It is comprised of three elements, Common Computing 
Environment (CCE), Cross Domain Solutions (CDS), and Afloat Core Services 
(ACS). 
The researcher examined previous work performed by the CANES team in 
the development of a business case for CANES.  This thesis also includes a 
section discussing some of the intangible benefits of CANES and the difference 
between cost savings and cost avoidance. 
The thesis focuses on quantifying the possible benefits of upgrading the 
current shipboard network system to the CANES system, and determining 
whether those benefits are likely to be realized in actual operations.  Table 1 is a 
summary of the discounted benefits of CANES and the discounted net 
investment required to run the CANES program. 
 
ROI CALCULATION (BY10$, in thousands) 
FY  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  Total
Discounted 
Benefits 
492  1489  3969  7079  9717  9267  8734  32913 30823 28826 27046 25294 23687 22135  20754  19422 271647
Discounted 
Investment 
84273 189227 235475 216807 240766 ‐22860 ‐21423 ‐20426 ‐79244 ‐66066 ‐31075 ‐98215 ‐79163 ‐45131  ‐88105  ‐44096 370744
Table 1.   Summary of Yearly CANES Benefits and Investment 
The researcher calculated a CANES ROI of 73 percent.  A sensitivity 
analysis was performed to examine how ignoring cost avoidance affects the 
calculated value of ROI, along with how much other input factors would have to 
change in order to make the CANES investment unattractive.  The researcher 
concluded, based on the sensitivity analysis, that the ROI is sensitive to changes 
 xvi
in manpower cost reductions and insensitive to changes in CANES installation 
costs, operational software maintenance costs, phase out costs for legacy 
networks, and costs to perform technical refreshment. 
 xvii
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The researcher develops a value for return on investment (ROI) for the 
Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) program.  
Lawmakers and U.S. Navy leadership would like to know how this program will 
impact future costs, so that informed decisions can be made regarding upgrades 
to the current state of shipboard information technology (IT) networks. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. Primer on Networks 
In order to understand what CANES is supposed to accomplish for the 
U.S. Navy’s shipboard network environment, a foundation in the basic operation 
of computer networks is necessary.  A local area network, or LAN, is a collection 
of computers or other devices connected via some sort of communications 
channel (wired or wireless) that allows users to communicate and share 
resources with other users.1   
For large enterprise-scale LANs of the type the U.S. Navy deploys on 
ships, these computers are organized in a client-server relationship.  A server is 
typically a powerful computer that runs specialized software that allows it to 
“serve” information requests from the computers users are operating, called 
clients.  Often servers will simply share files or other data with the clients, but 
they can also run e-mail systems, Internet sites, or host applications for the client  
 
                                            
1 Tracy V. Wilson and John Fuller, “How Home Networking Works,” HowStuffWorks, 
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/home-network5.htm (accessed March 3, 2010). 
 2
computers to access.2  Microsoft’s Windows Server 2003, Sun Microsystems’ 
Solaris 10, and Novell’s NetWare 6.5 are all examples of operating systems that 
run on computers acting as servers. 
To get servers to communicate with client computers, they need to be 
connected by switches.  Switches are hardware components that control the flow 
of information between different sections of the network that are connected to 
each other, called “nodes.”  The switches quickly send information from one node 
to the correct node instead of every node in the network, which greatly speeds up 
data transmission.3 
When data are exchanged between networks, instead of within different 
nodes of the same network, the data must be sent through a router.  The router 
is a specialized piece of network equipment that will examine the destination 
address of the data, determine where the information is supposed to go, and use 
that address to do two main jobs—make sure information does not travel where it 
is not needed, and make sure information gets to its proper destination.4  
Essentially, any time information must flow between two different networks, the 
router tells it where to go and how to get there. 
The final piece of hardware to get a LAN connected to the Internet is a 
modem.  A modem (modulator-demodulator) takes the digital information that is 
being sent on a network, and changes it into a form that can be transmitted by 
satellite, cable television line, phone line, or some other transmission media.  
                                            
2 PC World Staff, “Server Operating Systems,” PC World, 
http://www.pcworld.idg.com.au/article/151491/server_operating_systems/ (accessed March 5, 
2010). 
3 Jeff Tyson, “How LAN Switches Work,” HowStuffWorks, 
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/lan-switch4.htm (accessed March 5, 2010). 
4 Linksys, “How Routers Work,” http://www.linksysbycisco.com/static/us/Learning-
Center/Network-Basics/Network-Hardware/How-Routers-Work/index.html (accessed March 4, 
2010). 
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Likewise, a modem will take signals from the external transmission media and 
convert them to digital form to use in the network.5 
All these components can be combined to make most types of networks 
found in both home and business environments.  The U.S. Navy is no different—
it just has to use more specialized components suited for shipboard use.  In its 
most basic form, a shipboard computer network uses a client-server approach 
with several powerful computers acting as servers. All the workstations that 
sailors use act as clients.  The computers are connected across the various 
network nodes by switches to ensure fast data flow, and a router controls the 
flow of data between networks (there are often several different networks on 
each ship).  The router also interfaces with the modem (or is integrated with the 
modem) to handle the flow of data on and off the ship via satellite or radio 
communications.  Figure 1 illustrates a very basic shipboard LAN configuration. 
 
Figure 1.   Basic Shipboard LAN6 
Although the layout of a shipboard network is similar to most other 
computer networks, there is a difference in that the hardware used must be 
adapted to an at-sea environment.  One example of this equipment is the 
                                            
5 Marshall Brain, “How Modems Work,” HowStuffWorks, 
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/modem.htm (accessed March 10, 2010). 
6 PMW 165 Naval Afloat Networks, “DDG-51 Class,” Functional Baseline Configuration 
Integrated Shipboard Network System, August 21, 2001. 
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Automated Digital Network System (ADNS).  ADNS is the router that allows the 
shipboard network to communicate off-ship.  It provides ship-to-ship and ship-to-
shore Internet Protocol (IP) connectivity by efficiently using whatever off-ship 
communication bandwidth is available.  The terminals (shown in Figure 2) 
automatically and dynamically consolidate outgoing voice, data, and video into a 
standard IP stream that can be sent via satellite or line-of-site communications 
systems modems.7 
 
Figure 2.   Typical shipboard ADNS terminal8 
The major shipboard network systems that CANES promises to integrate 
are the Integrated Shipboard Network System (ISNS), Submarine Local Area 
Network (SUBLAN), Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange 
                                            
7 U.S. Navy, “Vision Presence Power 2005: A Program Guide to the U.S. Navy,” U.S. Navy, 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/policy/vision/vis05/top-v05.html (accessed April 3, 2010). 
8 Ibid. 
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System-Maritime (CENTRIXS-M), the Sensitive Compartmented Information 
Local Area Network (SCI LAN), and the Video Information Exchange Systems 
(VIXS) and Ships Video Distribution System (SVDS).  These network systems 
are described in the following section: 
a. ISNS 
ISNS is a system of hardware and software that together make up 
the legacy network infrastructure on surface ships throughout the fleet.  It is 
derived from a combination of even older programs of record (POR) in order to 
provide basic LAN services across all U.S. Navy ships.  It supports all 
classification levels (Top Secret to Unclassified) via separate hardware (i.e., 
computer terminals, network switches, servers, and associated cabling) for each 
network level.9 
b. SUBLAN 
SUBLAN is essentially the submarine variant of ISNS.  It handles 
the same classification levels and serves a similar function, just for U.S. Navy 
submarines.10 
c. CENTRIXS-M 
The CENTRIXS-M network was developed to enable IP 
communications (e-mail, Web, and chat) between U.S. Navy and allied ships.  
This separate communications network interfaces with ADNS, enabling high-
speed data transfer among seven different allied groups, including Japan, South 
Korea, NATO, and the Global Counter-Terrorism Task Force.11 
                                            
9 U.S. Navy, “Vision Presence Power 2005: A Program Guide to the U.S. Navy,” 




d. SCI LAN 
The SCI LAN provides a separate network for receipt and 
transmission of Special Intelligence (SI) and SCI data that satisfies the U.S. 
Navy’s criteria for computer security.  The network architecture is able to handle 
secure voice, video, and data transfer among SCI-capable platforms.12 
e. VIXS/SVDS 
The Video Information Exchange Systems (VIXS) and Shipboard 
Video Distribution System are add-on networks installed on ships to support 
video exchange, streaming video distribution, and Video Teleconferences (VTC).  
As of 2008, there were approximately 100 such systems in the fleet, with five 
different variants.13 
2. Current Fleet Network Status 
The U.S. Navy fleet has over 640 legacy systems that comprise the 
shipboard IT network environment.  These systems continue to be used because 
they still meet the U.S. Navy’s current needs, even though they do not do the job 
as well as a newer system and will not be able to meet the needs of the Navy in 
the future.  There are over 17 variants for hardware, 6 separate operating system 
variants, and 380 application versions of the software sailors use scattered 
throughout the fleet.14 
A typical U.S. Navy large surface combatant, such as a Ticonderoga-class 
cruiser or Arliegh Burke-class destroyer, has at least thirteen separate local area 
                                            
12 U.S. Navy, “Vision Presence Power 2005: A Program Guide to the U.S. Navy,” 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/policy/vision/vis05/top-v05.html (accessed April 3, 2010). 
13 PEO C4I PMW 160, Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) 
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) Detailed Report (October 31, 2008). 
14 Kevin Clarke, “Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) Overview: 
CANES Top 100 – Part 1 – Program Overview” (PowerPoint Presentation for PEO C4I PMW 160, 
August 21, 2009). 
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networks (LANs).15 These networks do not “talk” to each other—each one has 
separate hardware (including cabling) and separate software, which effectively 
creates “stovepipes” of information.  In addition, each one of these networks is 
managed separately.  Each one has its own update process for hardware and 
software, as well as its own system for security updates.16 
The concern over duplicate infrastructures and applications currently 
fielded on ships has reached the top levels of the U.S. Navy.  At the Annual Fleet 
N6 Conference at the Naval Network Warfare Command in 2006, the FY07 
Numbered Fleet Top Ten C4 Requirements were laid out, in part stating:   
The deployment of many Service-Oriented Programs 
(Maintenance, Administration, QOL, etc.) have (sic) resulted in 
unique networks deployed on ships that adversely load the existing 
ISNS backbone.  These systems are neither accounted for nor 
integrated with existing shipboard networks, except as required to 
allow off-ship connectivity.  All IP Networks, regardless of purpose, 
must be consolidated under the future network consolidation 
program, CANES, to ensure warfighting networks are not adversely 
affected and to allow a common view into the IP shipboard 
architecture.17 
It is estimated that the U.S. Navy spends $1.6 billion every year in legacy 
costs for this current system of shipboard networks.18  That figure is only 
expected to increase as components need to be replaced.  The mean time 
between failures (MBTF) rate is getting worse as the networks age.  Current 





                                            
15 Clarke, “Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) Overview.” 
16 Ibid. 
17 Commander U.S. Navy Second Fleet, “COMSECONDFLT FY07 NUMBERED FLEET TOP 
TEN C4 REQUIREMENTS” (Naval Message 071908ZSEP06, September 7, 2006). 
18 Rita Boland, “Ideas Become Reality As New Strategies Unfurl,” Signal (May 2008): 45. 
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good enough.  To fully support mission critical applications, a shipboard network 
must have a threshold of 99 percent readiness, with an objective readiness of 
99.9 percent.19 
3. CANES 
The CANES program is being developed to address the issues of the 
legacy shipboard network situation.  The stated goals of the CANES program 
are: 
1. Build a secure afloat network required for Naval and Joint 
operations. 
2. Consolidate and reduce the number of afloat networks through 
the use of mature cross-domain technologies and Common 
Computing Environment (CCE) infrastructure. 
3. Reduce the infrastructure footprint and associated costs for 
hardware afloat. 
4. Provide increased reliability, application hosting, and other 
capabilities to meet current and projected Warfighter requirements. 
5. Federate Net-Centric Enterprise Service (NCES) Afloat Core 
Services (ACS) to the tactical edge to support overall DoD 
(Department of Defense) Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
(C4ISR) applications migration to a Service Oriented Architecture 
(SOA) environment.20 
CANES is separated into three elements, which will function together to 
meet the project’s stated goals: 
                                            
19 Clarke, “Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) Overview.”). 
20 PEO C4I PMW 160, Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) 
Acquisition Plan (January 2009). 
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a. CCE 
The first element is the Common Computing Environment (CCE), 
which effectively consolidates a ship’s network hardware into a common 
networked core, instead of operating as many separated groups of dissimilar 
hardware.  This way the hardware and operating software for shipboard networks 
will all fall under a single POR for centralized management instead of the 
scattered duplication of infrastructures that exist today.  CCE allows the core 
network to host virtual versions of legacy applications, without the redundant 
hardware that the legacy programs required.  It will also standardize the delivery 
of security updates, and allow for a more managed approach to fleet-wide 
hardware and software updates to ensure shipboard networks remain relatively 
modern.21 
b. CDS 
The second element is Cross Domain Solutions (CDS), which 
allows different levels of security classification systems to all run together on the 
same client workstation.  CDS also allows users to set permission levels on data 
so that the same information could be accessed between security levels, while 
still maintaining the ability to prevent the flow of information across security 
domains on a case-by-case basis.22   
c. ACS 
The final element is Afloat Core Services (ACS), which takes a 
service oriented architecture (SOA) approach to decouple the hardware from 
dedicated software, and instead allow software developers to avoid having to re-
write duplicate functionality and use existing plug-in solutions to supply or 
                                            
21 Clarke, “Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) Overview.” 
22 Ibid. 
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transform data.23  For example, if an application writer wants to include the ability 
to display information collected from a ship’s sensors on a map, he or she 
wouldn’t have to write detailed code for each part—both the map display 
functionality and the sensor information aggregation would already exist as 
services, so the application writer could take those standard services and focus 
on providing enhanced features rather than on re-writing code that already exists. 
Figure 3 shows how CANES is an evolution of the current 
shipboard network environment.  The CCE will replace the separate ISNS, 
SUBLAN, SCI LAN, and CENTRIXS-M networks while maintaining their 
capabilities via CDS and ACS.  The CCE will then interface with ADNS to enable 
ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore IP connectivity.  CANES is not designed to replace 
the hull, mechanical, and electrical network (HM&E) that controls shipboard 
equipment at a low level, nor will it replace the combat systems networks that 
control the weapons, navigation, and fire control systems. 
                                            
23 David Perera, “CANES to consolidate shipboard networks,” Federal Computer Week, 
http://fcw.com/articles/2009/02/23/ngen-canes-to-consolidate-shipboard-networks.aspx, February 
19, 2009 (accessed April 5, 2010). 
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Figure 3.   CANES Evolution24 
CANES promises several benefits to U.S. Navy ships over the 
current system of installed networks.  It will use fewer physical server racks, 
lowering overall ship weight and freeing up space for other uses.  CANES will 
provide for centrally managed security management by remotely applying 
security patches, which could lead to improved shipboard network security.  
Ships that upgrade to CANES are also expected to have a higher network 
availability than current network systems, by increasing the mean time between 
failures while reducing time required to recover from a failure.25 
                                            
24 Clarke, “Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) Overview.” 
25 Ibid. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Primary Research Question:  
What is the value for a comprehensive ROI for the CANES program? 
Secondary Research Questions: 
1. What are the savings for the CANES program (versus cost 
avoidance)? 
2. Which predicted benefits can be monetized? 
 13
II. PRIOR WORK 
A. CANES ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
1. AoA Process 
During the procurement process for Department of Defense (DoD) 
programs, an agency is required to conduct an analysis of alternatives (AoA) to 
determine the scope and requirements of the program per DoD instruction 
5000.02. For the CANES program, this was completed on October 31, 2008. 
Under DoD guidelines, the AoA is separated into two phases.  The first 
phase has four tasks: 
• Identify the operational imperative for change, along with any new 
requirements that imperative brings 
• Identify possible risks for the planned technologies 
• Using the requirements and risks, identify viable alternatives 
• Determine appropriate Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) and 
Measures of Performance (MOP) that are objective and can be 
quantified 
The second phase of the AoA has two tasks: establish the status quo, or 
baseline, and then evaluate the alternatives identified in the first phase.  The 
evaluation consists of an effectiveness analysis, a risk analysis, and a cost 
estimation analysis.  Those factors are combined into an overall cost-
effectiveness analysis to determine which alternative best meets the required 
need. 
 14
2. Viable Alternatives 
Three alternatives were considered in the first phase of the AoA process  
that met the material effectiveness requirement.  The first of these alternatives is 
called Consolidate and Enhance (C&E), which involves collapsing the existing 
shipboard networks into three network backbones, separated by their security 
domains (Unclassified, Secret, and SCI).  The management of the three 
combined networks would fall under a single POR that would encompass the 
CANES program’s three elements (CCE, ACS, and CDS).  The second 
alternative is called Consolidate and Enhance with Two PORs (C&E 2 POR), 
which is materially the same as Consolidate and Enhance, but separates CCE 
and ACS as two separate functional areas, each with its own POR for 
acquisition.  The third alternative is called Consolidate and Enhance With Two 
Sub-Programs (C&E 2 Sub-Prog), and again it is materially the same as the first 
two alternatives, but CCE and ACS would be treated as separate increments (or 
sub-programs) within the same POR.  The system could then be fielded in parts 
in a phased deployment to mitigate the risk if the ACS element is not technically 
mature when the CCE element is ready for installation in the fleet. 
3. Analysis 
Although the performance of an AoA requires risk, effectiveness, and cost 
analysis, the researcher examined only the cost analysis portion of the AoA.  The 
cost analysis was based on developing a complete Life Cycle Cost Estimate 
(LCCE) for the three identified alternatives.  The life cycle of each alternative was 
defined as from “the initial implementation period through Full Operational 
Capability (FOC) plus ten years of operation.”26  For the three viable alternatives, 
then, the period to be analyzed was from FY2010–FY2026. 
                                            
26 PEO C4I PMW 160, Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) 
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) Detailed Report (October 31, 2008). 
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The cost analysis produced full LCCEs for each alternative as well as one 
for the status quo, which are all included in the Appendix (Tables 22–25).  Some 
of the important assumptions used in developing the LCCEs are: 
• January 2008 Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) inflation 
indices were used. 
• For the status quo, a technical refresh (shipwide network 
improvement) was assumed to occur every three years for software 
and every six years for hardware. 
• Technical refresh for the viable alternatives was assumed to occur 
every two years for software and every four years for hardware. 
• Any ship within five years of decommissioning was not included in 
the technical refresh plans. 
• All costs were estimated based on available data. 
• Costs to migrate applications to CANES were estimated using five 
programs (called Early Adopters) as a representative sample.  The 
five Early Adopter (EA) programs were: 
o Global Command and Control System-Maritime (GCCS-M) 
o Distributed Common Ground System-Navy (DCGS-N) 
o Naval Tactical Command Support System (NTCSS) 
o Computer Network Defense (CND) 
o Navy Modular Automated Communications System II-Single 
Messaging Solution (NAVMACS II/SMS) Defense 
Messaging System (DMS) Proxy programs 
The reason these assumptions are highlighted is that the researcher used 
similar assumptions for the ROI calculations in this thesis. The researcher’s 
assumptions are addressed in the Analysis section. 
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The equation (Figure 4) the AoA team used to calculate each alternative’s 
ROI is based on the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Program Analysis 
and Evaluation (PA&E) recommended cost difference model, which compares 


























Figure 4.   AoA ROI Equation27 
The numerator for the formula is the present value (PV) of the differences 
in the cost between the each alternative and the status quo, where d is the 
discount rate for the period, t is the time, EOI is the end of the increment, N is the 
period of interest (in this case, FY 2026), and B is intangible benefits.  Any 
intangible benefits that could not be monetized were ignored for the purposes of 
the AoA, which set B equal to zero.  The denominator is the PV of the amount of 
funds invested to deploy and operate the alternative. 
Based on the results of the LCCE for the three alternatives, compared to 
the estimated costs of the status quo, the AoA team generated a summary table 
(Table 2) showing the estimated ROI for each alternative. 
 
Alternative Consolidate and Enhance Consolidate and Enhance 
With 2 Sub-Programs 
Consolidate and Enhance 
With 2 PORs 
Discounted ROI 99% 95% 74% 
Table 2.   AoA ROI Results28 
                                            
27 PEO C4I PMW 160, Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) 
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) Detailed Report (October 31, 2008). 
28 Ibid. 
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Also based on the same cost estimates, the AoA team developed a break-
even analysis graph (Figure 5), which shows the point where the viable 
alternative’s total costs are less than the status quo.  Note that the curves for 
C&E and C&E 2 Sub-Prog are difficult to distinguish because the spending 
profiles for those alternatives are so similar. 
 
 
Figure 5.   AoA Break-Even Analysis29 
The analysis shows that the alternatives should have a break-even point 
approximately 6–7 years after Initial Operational Capability in FY2011. 
4. Result of AoA 
The preferred alternative that the CANES AoA team chose was the 
Consolidate and Enhance with 2 Sub-programs, for the following reasons: 
• It provides for separate visibility of CCE and ACS acquisitions 
under one Program of Record (POR). 
                                            
29 PEO C4I PMW 160, Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) 
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) Detailed Report (October 31, 2008). 
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• CCE would be able to proceed if ACS was delayed. 
• It delivers a much-needed technology refresh to aging legacy 
systems. 
• It reflected the best cost/utility in support of warfighter 
requirements.30 
B. PRELIMINARY COST SAVINGS 
Since the publication of the AoA, a trial version of CANES has been 
installed on two ships for testing and evaluation, USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN 
(CVN 72) and USS CAPE ST GEORGE (CG 71).  The CANES team was able to 
use cost information from the hardware and software installation while the ships 
were in shipyards in FY 2009 to generate more detailed data on how much it 
would cost to deploy CANES throughout the fleet.  First, the CANES team 
determined the cost to procure and install the legacy network system on the two 
ships being upgraded.  Then, they calculated the costs to procure and install the 
Early Adopter (EA) version of CANES being used for testing, which hosts 22 
applications as services on USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN and 16 applications on 
USS CAPE ST GEORGE.  The cost summaries that the CANES team generated 
from these new data are included as Tables 3 and 4.  Items that are highlighted 
in grey are estimates from the CANES team; all other numbers are actual costs.  
Note that ISNS has a higher cost under CANES.  The reason for the increased 
cost is due to higher server requirements on the core ISNS system for the 
virtualization requirements to host all the other installed systems under CANES. 
                                            
30 PEO C4I PMW 160, Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) 








AIS $93  $24  
NITES/VNE-NCS $237  $0  
GCCS-M $2,600  $305  
NTCSS $767  $153  
CfN $726  $108  
CND $518  $71  
USW-DSS $500  $20  
NIAPS $726  $70  
ARRS - CAS $363  $75  
ARRS - MRAS $363  $75  
ARRS - CASREP $363  $75  
ARRS - IRRI $363  $75  
TMIP-M $726  $15  
MCMS $726  $237  
OOMA $726  $18  
MEDAL part of GCCS-M part of GCCS-M 
AMSRR $726  $237  
CV Sharp $726  $237  
 DCGS-N BLK I ECP $3,420  $2,455  
 DIOS-S unknown unknown 
ISNS $11,467  $18,643  
Total: $26,137  $22,893  
 
Table 3.   USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN Early Adopter Cost Comparison31 
                                            
31 PEO C4I PMW 160, “Early Adopters ROI.xls” (Excel Spreadsheet data for PEO C4I PMW 








NITES/VNE-NCS part of ISNS part of ISNS 
GCCS-M $525  $90  
NTCSS $229  $95  
CND $352  $25  
USW-DSS $400  $20  
NIAPS $726  $70  
ARRS - CAS $363  $75  
ARRS - MRAS $363  $75  
ARRS - CASREP $363  $75  
ARRS - IRRI $363  $75  
TMIP-M $726  $15  
MCMS $726  $237  
MEDAL $726  $237  
 NEURS $726  $237  
 DIO-S unknown unknown 
ISNS $3,328  $6,152  
Total: $9,917  $7,477  
 
Table 4.   USS CAPE ST GEORGE Early Adopter Cost Comparison32 
According to the CANES team ROI brief, as more legacy systems are 
moved to a hosted environment (from 17 and 22 hosted applications for Early 




                                            
32 PEO C4I PMW 160, “Early Adopters ROI.xls” (Excel Spreadsheet data for PEO C4I PMW 




The researcher used the framework of the AoA to guide the generation of 
a ROI.  The basic calculation of the ROI from the AoA is the same, but with the 
addition of updated information available since the AoA was published in 2008, 
along with some estimates made using case studies to monetize benefits that 
were not addressed in the AoA.   
The first step was to determine the time period for the analysis.  The AoA 
used a period of 17 years, from FY 2010 to FY 2026.  The researcher used a 
similar time period, but chose to ignore FY 2010 and only focus on FY 2011 to 
FY 2026 because anything prior to FY2011 is a sunk cost and is not relevant to 
the ROI. 
Next, the researcher collected cost data and estimates relevant to the 
initial ship installs and upgrades portion of the CANES project.  The most recent 
data and schedules were used wherever possible, with the actual cost data 
coming from the AoA or CANES project team. 
To monetize the benefits of CANES, the researcher used case studies 
from private industry and the government to quantify the less tangible benefits of 
the CANES program.  For example, when examining the possible savings on 
manpower, the 2009 study by the RAND Corporation on the effects of the 
CANES project provided valuable information on how manpower requirements 
might be impacted by the use of CANES in the fleet.  These case studies were 
then used to develop estimates for the different benefits examined. 
Once all the data and estimates were collected, the researcher adjusted 
the values to ensure they were all stated in Base Year (BY) 2010 thousands of 
dollars, by using the appropriate inflation tables provided by OSD.  This step 
insured that any comparison of costs would be valid across different years. 
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After converting all values to BY 2010 amounts, the researcher used the 
same calculation for ROI as the AoA team (detailed in the Prior Work section, 
Figure 4) to allow for ease of comparison between the researcher’s results and 
the AOA team’s results, which is presented in the conclusion.  Once the base 
ROI calculation was made, the final step was to perform a sensitivity analysis by 
adjusting various inputs to the formula to see how they affected the ROI.   
B. COST AVOIDANCE VERSUS COST SAVINGS 
Cost avoidance and cost savings are related terms that are sometimes 
used interchangeably, but it is useful when doing cost estimations to recognize 
that the terms are not synonymous.  Cost avoidance, for the purposes of this 
thesis, is defined as a possible reduction in money laid out in future periods.33  
An example of a cost avoidance would be a process improvement to reduce 
future costs in one area or reduce workload of a company’s support staff, but the 
potential benefits may not be realized because they are dependent on cost or 
workload reductions in other areas being made.  The problem is that cost 
avoidance may be intangible or unrealized.   
Cost savings is defined as a method that will meet the project’s objectives, 
but at a lower cost than what was paid historically or quoted by the supplier.34  
Examples of cost savings would be a lowered energy cost by converting an office 
from incandescent to fluorescent light bulbs—the savings are not dependent on 
cost reductions in other areas, and are likely to be realized.  Cost savings are 
tangible benefits that can be recorded and programmed in a budget.   
 
                                            
33 NASPO Benchmarking Workgroup, “Benchmarking Cost Savings and Avoidance,” 
NASPO, 
http://www.naspo.org/documents/Benchmarking_Cost_Savings__and_Cost_Avoidance.pdf 
(accessed April 4, 2010). 
34 Penn State Auxiliary & Business Services, “Purchasing,” Penn State Auxiliary & Business 
Services, http://www.purchasing.psu.edu/glossary.shtml (accessed March 24, 2010). 
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Any benefits identified in this thesis that have an estimated value were 
identified as either a cost savings or a cost avoidance.  The researcher then 
examined what the ROI would be if all benefits identified as cost avoidances 
were excluded compared to the standard ROI that includes benefits identified as 
cost avoidance. 
C. INTANGIBLE BENEFITS 
Potential benefits of CANES that were not possible to monetize are 
considered intangible benefits for the purposes of this thesis.  Multiple benefits 
fall into this category; for example, the space and weight saved on ships due to 
consolidating servers onto fewer racks was not monetized.  There is a definite 
benefit to freeing up space and reducing weight on U.S. Navy ships so that extra 
spare parts could be stored onboard or extra equipment that adds more 
warfighting capabilities could be installed.  However, assigning a specific value to 
the benefits that could be realized from such factors of CANES is highly 
subjective, so those benefits are ignored for the ROI calculation. 
Any benefits of the CANES program identified in the ROI analysis or 
introductory CANES description that could not be monetized in this thesis are 
discussed in the conclusion as items to consider in conjunction with the ROI 
estimate. 
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The researcher made the following assumptions to calculate the ROI for 
the CANES program: 
• December 2009 OSD inflation indices were used. 
• Technical refresh for CANES was assumed to occur every two 
years for software and every four years for hardware. 
• Any ship within five years of decommissioning was not included in 
the analysis. 
• The only ships considered in the analysis are Aircraft Carriers, 
Large Surface Combatants, Attack Submarines, Ballistic Missile 
Submarines, and Amphibious Warfare Ships. 
• All costs were estimated based on available data. 
The ship type and decommissioning assumptions were chosen to limit the 
number of ships analyzed to ones that either have cost data available or are 
similar enough to the ships analyzed so that estimates could be made.  The 
technical refresh assumption is based on the CANES fielding plan that explains 
the technical refresh schedule, and is necessary to estimate the costs associated 
with updating shipboard hardware and software.  All other assumptions were 
made to ensure the most recent data were being used. 
B. CANES PROCUREMENT AND INSTALLATION COST 
The LCCE for the status quo from the CANES AoA was used as the data 
source for legacy system costs.  These data are presented in the Appendix 
(Tables 22–25). 
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For initial CANES installs on ships to be built within the identified time 
period (FY 2011 to FY 2026), a combination of the Long-Range Naval 
Construction Plan for FY 2011 (Table 5) and the newest cost information the 
CANES team developed from the Early Adopters was used.   
 
 FY  11  12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22  23  24  25  26
 Aircraft Carrier      1          1          1       
 Large Surface Combatant  2  1  2  1  2  1  2  1  2  1  2  1  2  1  1  2 
 Attack Submarine  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  1  2  2  2  2  1  1  1  1 
 Ballistic Missile Submarine                  1      1    1  1  1 
 Big‐Deck Amphibious Ships  1          1          1        1   
 Small Amphibious Ships    1          1    1    1    1    1   
Table 5.   FY 2011–2026 Long-Range Naval Construction Plan35 
According to the Long-Range Naval Construction Plan, Large Surface 
Combatants include Destroyers (DDG) and Cruisers (CG).  Amphibious warfare 
ships are not broken down into “Big-Deck Amphibious Ships” (LHA/LHD) and 
“Small Amphibious Ships” (LPD/LSD) in the Construction Plan chart that Table 5 
was based on, but the text of the report describes the sequencing plan for those 
ships and was used to generate Table 5.36 
The researcher took the ships from the construction plan and sorted them 
into three groups: Force Level (FL), Unit Level (UL), Submarines (SUB), as 
shown in Table 6.  The ships in each group all have similar computer network 
layouts and capabilities, so the costs for CANES installation are assumed to be 
identical within the group.  This is the same assumption used by the CANES 
team, so the data they collected could be used in this analysis. 
 
 
                                            
35 Director, Warfare Integration (OPNAV N8F), Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range 












Table 6.   Ship Classification Breakdown 
The initial installation cost for CANES on each group of ships was based 
on the data from the CANES team Early Adopters study, which included 
hardware and software procurement and system installation.  The researcher 
also included estimated costs the CANES team identified to install 40 hosted 
applications rather than the limited number from the Early Adopters study in 
order to get a more representative number for the cost to install the full CANES 
suite.  An Early Adopter study for submarine platforms could not be identified, so 
to determine the initial CANES installation cost for submarines, the researcher 
determined that submarines cost 8.1 percent less to upgrade than UL class ships 
based on AoA cost data.37  Therefore, the cost to perform an initial install of 
CANES on a submarine could be approximated as being 8.1 percent less than 
an initial CANES installation for a UL ship.  The initial CANES installation costs 





Table 7.   Initial CANES Installation Costs38 
 
 
                                            
37 PEO C4I PMW 160, Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) 
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) Detailed Report (October 31, 2008). 
38 PEO C4I PMW 160, “Early Adopters ROI.xls” (Excel Spreadsheet data for PEO C4I PMW 
160, May 6, 2010). 
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The cost to perform initial installs of the legacy shipboard network systems 
was taken from the same CANES Early Adopter study.  Again, submarine legacy 
installation costs were assumed to be 8.1 percent less than legacy installation 





Table 8.   Initial Legacy Installation Costs39 
Current U.S. Navy ships that required upgrades to CANES used cost data 
from the AoA based on the amount of work required for the upgrade (major, 
medium, or minor), which was converted to BY10$ and is summarized in Table 9.   
CANES Upgrade Costs (BY10$, in thousands) 
 Ship Type  FL  UL  SUB 
 Upgrade Type  Major  Medium  Minor  Major  Meduim  Minor  Medium 
 Cost  32,635  24,795  22,901  8,875  8,105  8,074  7,446 
Table 9.   CANES Upgrade Costs40 
The upgrade cost information was combined with the CANES upgrade 
schedule from the CANES team (Table 10). Note that all upgrades are due to 
occur by the end of FY 2016.  
 FY  11  12  13  14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22  23  24  25 26
 FL ‐ Major  0  2  2  0  3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 FL ‐ Medium  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 FL ‐ Minor  0  0  3  5  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 UL ‐ Major  0  1  3  6  5  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 UL ‐ Medium  2  2  3  3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 UL ‐ Minor  0  1  6  9  13 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 SUB ‐ Medium  0  0  0  2  4  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Table 10.   CANES Fleet Upgrade Schedule41 
                                            
39 PEO C4I PMW 160, Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) 
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) Detailed Report (October 31, 2008). 
40 Ibid. 
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The researcher combined all the cost data for initial installations and fleet 
upgrades to create a summary table of all costs associated with CANES 
procurement and installation (Table 11) for each year in the analysis. 
CANES Procurement and Installation Cost Summary (BY10$, in thousands) 
 FY  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  TOTAL 
 Initial Installation  49933  39612  73407  29291  39612 63086 49933 53601 59418 29291 83728 38776 74243  29291  73407  39612 826241 
 Upgrade  16210  98430  233357  279627  277027 22901 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  927551 
 Total  66143  138042  306764  308918  316639 85987 49933 53601 59418 29291 83728 38776 74243  29291  73407  39612 1753792
Table 11.   CANES Procurement and Installation Cost Summary 
C. SOFTWARE COSTS AND BENEFITS 
To determine the possible software savings that could be realized with a 
fleet-wide adoption of CANES, the researcher used three case studies that 
examined the effect of adopting a Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) by 
several companies.   
The first case study was conducted by IBM in 2006, to determine how 
businesses were able to use SOA to lower their costs.  The results of the study 
show companies that transitioned to SOA from their legacy systems were able to 
reduce their software development cost by 25 percent as well as reducing the 
time it took to develop the software.42 
The second case study, by Joshua Greenbaum of Enterprise Applications 






                                            
41 Clarke, “Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) Overview.” 
42 Luba Cherbakov et al., “SOA in action inside IBM, Part 1: SOA case studies,” IBM, 
http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/webservices/library/ws-soa-in-action/ (accessed April 10, 
2010). 
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much software code could be reused.  This study determined that businesses 
could expect a software development cost to be from 13 to 35 percent lower by 
taking a SOA approach.43 
The final case study was conducted by LogicLibrary in 2006, and 
surveyed businesses that implemented large-scale SOAs.  The responses 
indicated that software development costs using SOA were approximately one-
half what was required for traditional software development.  An important finding 
of the case study was that the cost for the companies to maintain their software 
applications was reduced by 90 percent when using SOA versus traditional 
software environments.44 
Based on the results of the three case studies, the researcher used a 
value of 25 percent for the expected level of savings that could be realized for 
software development due to CANES.  The researcher chose a value of 25 
percent for software development savings because it was a lower boundary of 
the estimated savings realized in similar projects identified in the three case 
studies.  To apply that expected level of savings to the ROI model, the 
researcher used the status quo costs for software development, testing, and 
evaluation from the AoA, and lowered those costs by 25 percent.  Table 12 
summarizes the expected costs for CANES software, which are used for the 
software refresh for ships with CANES that occurs every two years. 
 
CANES Software Refresh Cost Summary (BY10$, in thousands) 




1075 1042 751 1307 857 608 580 526 526 526 526 526 526 526 526 526  10954
                                            
43 Joshua Greenbaum, “Return on Investment for Composite Applications and Service 
Oriented Architectures: A Model for Financial Success and Enterprise Efficiency,” Enterprise 
Applications Consulting, www.eaconsult.com/articles/SOA_ROI_EACReport.pdf (accessed April 
15, 2010). 
44 Jeffrey Poulin and Alan Himler, “The ROI of SOA Based on Traditional Component 
Reuse,” LogicLibrary, www.logiclibrary.com/pdf/wp/ROI_of_SOA.pdf (accessed April 28, 2010). 
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Table 12.   CANES Software Refresh Cost Summary 
The CANES program will reduce the operational costs of software 
maintenance by an estimated 90 percent, based on the findings of the 
LogicLibrary case study. The researcher calculated how such a reduction would 
impact CANES by first converting the status quo costs for operational software 
maintenance to BY10$ (Table 13).   
Status Quo Operational Software Maintenance costs (BY10$, in thousands) 
 FY  11  12  13  14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22  23  24  25 26
 Software Maintenance  5654 5654 5654 5654 5654 5654 5654 5654 5654 5654 5654 5654 5654 5607 5607 5607
Table 13.   Status Quo Operational Software Maintenance Cost45 
The researcher then used the percentage of ships that had transitioned to 
CANES (from the CANES fleet upgrade schedule) along with the 90 percent 
expected reduction in operating cost to develop the yearly cost reduction in 
operational software maintenance due to CANES (Table 14). 
CANES Operational Software Maintenance Cost Reduction (BY10$, in thousands) 
 FY  11  12  13  14  15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24  25  26  Total
Software 
Maintenance Savings 
134  536  1674  3348  5022 5089 5089 5089 5089 5089 5089 5089 5089 5046  5046  5046 66563
Table 14.   CANES Operational Software Maintenance Cost Reduction 
The operational software maintenance cost reduction is considered a cost 
avoidance for the purposes of this thesis, because the cost reduction cannot be 
tied to any one cost element for budgeting purposes and may not ever be 
realized.  The effects of ignoring this cost avoidance are examined in the 
Sensitivity Analysis section of the thesis. 
                                            
45 PEO C4I PMW 160, Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) 
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) Detailed Report (October 31, 2008). 
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D. POWER SAVINGS 
One of the possible benefits of CANES is a reduction in energy use for 
cooling network hardware, as well as lowered energy use to power all the servers 
that run the network due to less physical hardware required.  To quantify the 
savings that could be seen from the reduced energy use, the researcher 
determined how much fuel would be saved on ships that were not nuclear-
powered.  Submarines and aircraft carriers were not included in the analysis 
because it is difficult to quantify how much nuclear fuel is used for cooling and 
electricity generation, and how much a given unit of fuel would cost.  The 
calculations for conventionally fueled ships are more straightforward.  The 
researcher also assumed that the fuel savings for all ships analyzed could be 
approximated based on the fuel consumption of an Allison AG9140 Gas Turbine 
Generator, which generates electricity on destroyers and cruisers and accounts 
for the generator used on the majority of ships being analyzed.46 
The CANES team estimated that, for a full CANES install, approximately 
22 fewer racks of servers would be required for a FL class ship, and 8 fewer for a 
UL ship.47  Each rack uses 3.3 kilowatts (kw), according to the AoA Cost 
Effectiveness Report.48  Given the fuel usage rate of the Allison Gas Turbine 
Generators of 15,375 BTU/kw-hr49, and the energy content of U.S. Navy fuel 
(Diesel Fuel Marine) of 138,700 BTU/gallon50, the researcher calculated that 
each rack that could be removed from a ship would save over 3,204 gallons 
every year assuming full operation.  Since 50 percent of ships are away from 
                                            
46 Rolls-Royce, “Allison AG9140 and AG9140RF Ship Service Generators Fact Sheet,” 
http://www.rolls-
royce.com/Images/MMS%20FS%2053%2008%201%20Allison%20AG9140%20and%20AG9140
RF%20_tcm92-9324.pdf (accessed April 13, 2010). 
47 PEO C4I PMW 160, “Early Adopters ROI.xls” (Excel Spreadsheet data for PEO C4I PMW 
160, May 6, 2010). 
48 PEO C4I PMW 160, Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) 
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) Detailed Report (October 31, 2008). 
49 Rolls-Royce, “Allison AG9140 and AG9140RF Ship Service Generators Fact Sheet,”  
50 U.S. Department of the Interior, “BTU Conversion Table,” www.doi.gov/pam/eneratt2.html 
(accessed April 15, 2010). 
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their homeport at any given time51, the researcher assumed that the ships are 
operational 50 percent of the time, so each rack removed per ship would 
therefore save 1,602 gallons of fuel every year. 
The Defense Energy Support Center established the standard price for 
Diesel Fuel Marine as of January 1, 2010, to be $2.81 per gallon.52  The 
researcher combined the price of fuel with the yearly amount of fuel saved per 
rack and the number of racks saved for FL and UL ships, along with the CANES 
upgrade schedule to produce a yearly breakdown of anticipated fuel savings by 
transitioning to CANES across the fleet (Table 15). 
 
Expected CANES Fuel Savings (BY10$, in thousands) 
 FY  11  12  13  14  15  16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24  25  26  Total
 Fuel Savings  181 498  1303  2290  3213 3349 3457 3493 3602 3638 3846 3883 3991 4027  4199  4272 49242
Table 15.   Expected CANES Fuel Savings 
The fuel savings expected due to CANES are classified as cost savings 
for the purposes of this thesis because the reduced fuel use is directly tied to a 
reduction in racks installed on ships, making it possible to reflect in a budget 
process. 
Fuel savings are not the only benefit of lowering the number of racks 
installed on U.S. Navy ships.  Each rack weighs 845 pounds, so a FL ship would 
see a reduction of 18,590 pounds in weight, plus any additional weight reduction 
due to an expected decrease in required network cabling.53  This weight 
reduction and associated space savings from rack removal could allow the ship 
to carry more spare parts or supplies for extended deployments.  The U.S. Navy 
                                            
51 U.S. Navy, “Status of the Navy,” 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/navy_legacy_hr.asp?id=146 (accessed April 23, 2010). 
52 Defense Energy Support Center, “FY 2010 Standard Prices,” 
https://www.desc.dla.mil/DCM/Files/JAN.01.2010.pdf (accessed April 23, 2010). 
53 PEO C4I PMW 160, Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) 
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) Detailed Report (October 31, 2008). 
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could install more damage-control equipment for combating ship disasters, or 
increase the habitability of spaces around the ship by giving the sailors extra 
room.  Since there are so many possibilities for the resulting space and weight 
savings, any quantification would be speculative, and those benefits are 
considered intangible.  
E. MANPOWER REDUCTION 
The RAND Corporation conducted a case study in 2009 that examined the 
effect of CANES on shipboard IT manning.  The study noted the issues 
surrounding possible shipboard manpower reduction, including the fact that any 
reduction may be less than calculated because sailors may still be required to fill 
other roles on a ship such as for damage control.  The study concludes that a 
manpower reduction of 6–12 percent per ship could be possible, depending on 
manning requirements for the rest of the ship.54 
Several alternatives are presented based on the data from the RAND case 
study.  The scenario the researcher chose to use for the CANES ROI calculation 
is that manpower requirements could be reduced by 6 percent compared to the 
status quo, as this was the most conservative assumption that still showed a 
benefit to manning reduction.  Because of the uncertainty level in realizing any 
savings from a manpower reduction, this factor is classified as a potential cost 
avoidance for the purposes of this thesis.  The possibility that ship manning might 
not be able to be reduced at all or that a higher than expected manning reduction 
of 12 percent could be seen is explored later in the sensitivity analysis section.  
Based on the assumed 6 percent manpower reduction, the manpower 
cost avoidance was calculated by multiplying the status quo operational 
manpower costs by the expected percent reduction and percentage of the fleet 
converted to CANES, which gives yearly manpower savings in Table 16. 
                                            
54 RAND National Defense Research Institute, Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise 
Services (CANES) Manpower, Personnel, and Training Implications (RAND Corporation, 2009). 
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Expected CANES Manpower Cost Avoidance for 6% Reduction (BY10$, in thousands) 
 FY  11 12  13  14  15  16 17 18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  Total
 Personnel Savings  114  460  1467  2935  4402  4461 4461 44169 44169 44169 44169 44169 44169 44169  44169  44169  415821 
Table 16.   Expected Yearly CANES Manpower Cost Avoidance 
F. CALCULATION 
The researcher used the same equation to calculate CANES ROI that was 
used in the AoA report (Figure 4).  To recap, the ROI is the discounted benefits 
of CANES, divided by the discounted net investment to install and maintain 
CANES over the status quo.  The researcher chose a discount rate of 7 percent, 
which is the official discount rate used for evaluating government projects.55  
Because all the cost data is already in BY 2010 dollars, inflation is already taken 
into account, so the 7 percent discount represents the real discount rate vice a 
nominal rate. 
In addition to the costs and savings identified earlier in the analysis, 
additional costs must also be included to address the costs to implement and run 
the CANES program.  These costs include the Program Management costs for 
both the CCE and ACS, and the hardware refresh costs to update shipboard 
network hardware every four years.  Table 17 is a summary of costs from the 
AoA (C&E with 2 Sub-Prog) that have been adjusted to BY10$ and must be 
included in the ROI calculation. 
                                            
55 Office of Management and Budget, “Circular No. A-94 Revised,” 
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/rewrite/circulars/a094/a094.html (accessed April 22, 2010). 
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Summary of Additional CANES Costs (BY10$, in thousands) 
FY  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  Total 
 CCE Management  13497 10463 5617  6139  5176  5024 1998  2037 2169  2212 2257  2301  2348  2394  2442  2491  68564 
 ACS Management  1419  1099 590  645  545  528  210  214  228  233  237  242  246  252  257  262  7207 
 CCE Tech Refresh  0  14  1990 12771 39053 59528 102842 91244 111644 75015 111320 98765 120847 81198  114380  106906 1127515
 Total  14916 11576 8197 19554 44773 65080 105050 93496 114040 77460 113814 101308 123441 83844  117079  109659 1203286
Table 17.   Summary of Additional CANES Costs56 
If CANES were to be implemented, there would be costs associated with 
phasing out the status quo, such as severing contracts and closing production 
lines.  These costs are taken from the AoA report and adjusted to BY10$, and 
presented as Table 18.   
Status Quo Phaseout (BY10$, in thousands) 
 FY  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26  Total
 Status Quo Phaseout  385293  341764  427328  470276 201737 240415 157215 93706 79625 24179 0  0  0  0  0  0  2421539
Table 18.   Status Quo Phaseout57 
The ROI calculation is summarized in Table 19.  The discounted benefit of 
$271,647,000 was calculated by summing yearly manpower savings, fuel use 
savings, and software savings, and then discounting by 7 percent.  The net 
discounted investment of $370,744,000 was calculated by summing all earlier 
costs identified in the analysis (installation/upgrade, hardware and software tech 
refresh, and program management costs), adding in the phaseout costs for the 
status quo, subtracting out the total investment costs for the status quo, and then 
applying the 7 percent discount rate. 
                                            
56 PEO C4I PMW 160, Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) 




 FY  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  Total
 Benefits  492  1593  4544  8672  12737  12998 13107 52851 52959 52996 53204 53240 53349 53342  53514  53586 533184
 Discounted  
Benefits 
492  1489  3969  7079  9717  9267  8734  32913 30823 28826 27046 25294 23687 22135  20754  19422 271647
                                   
 CANES 
investment 
105609 150660 315712 329779 362268 151675155564147623 173984 107277 198067 140610 198210 113661  191012  149797 2991507
 + SQ  
 Phaseout 
385293 341764 427328 470276 201737 240415157215 93706 79625 24179 0  0  0  0  0  0  2421539
 ‐ SQ  
Investment 
406629 289951 473445 534458 248410 424152344929274128 389764 252915 259197 347339 376499 222420  418194  271460 5533890
 Investment  
(net) 
84273 202473 269596 265597 315595 ‐32062 ‐32150 ‐32799 ‐136156‐121459 ‐61130 ‐206728‐178289‐108759 ‐227182 ‐121663 ‐120844
 Discounted  
Investment 
84273 189227 235475 216807 240766 ‐22860 ‐21423 ‐20426 ‐79244 ‐66066 ‐31075 ‐98215 ‐79163 ‐45131  ‐88105  ‐44096 370744
Table 19.   Summary of ROI Calculation 
The ROI for CANES was calculated by dividing the total discounted 
benefits by the total discounted net investment, and resulted in a value of 73 
percent. 
G. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
The researcher used two different methods to examine how the CANES 
ROI would change if different inputs or cost assumptions were used.  The first 
method was to adjust the calculated ROI value of CANES by removing benefits 
that were identified as cost avoidances. The second method calculated how 
much different cost factors would have to change to lower the ROI to 20 percent, 
which is the minimum acceptable ROI for IT projects  identified in a survey of 100 
companies.58 
For the first sensitivity analysis method, the cost avoidances identified 
earlier in the Analysis section were manpower benefits and operational software 
maintenance.  The researcher explored the effect on ROI for the following 
variations: 
                                            
58 Anthony Cresswell, “Return on Investment in Information Technology: A Guide for 
Managers,” University of Albany, www.ctg.albany.edu/publications/guides/roi/roi.pdf (accessed 
May 13, 2010). 
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• Removing all benefits identified as cost avoidances, since those 
values may never be realized  
• Removing only the manpower cost avoidance 
• Removing only the operational software maintenance cost 
avoidance 
• Increasing manpower cost avoidance to 12 from 6 percent, based 
on the high end of the RAND study results 







Table 20.   Summary of ROI Variations 
The results of the first sensitivity analysis method shows the relative 
impact of manpower cost to the estimated CANES ROI. If ship manning cannot 
be lowered after CANES is implemented, the ROI will drop from 73 percent to 
17.8 percent.  However, if ship manning can actually be reduced even more than 
the 6 percent the RAND study estimated, the CANES ROI could be higher. 
The inputs the researcher examined for the second sensitivity analysis 
method (to see what it would take to lower ROI to 20 percent) were CANES 
installation costs (both upgrades and initial installations), status quo phaseout 
costs, and technical refresh costs (both hardware and software).  The results are 









Table 21.   Summary of Required Cost Increases to Lower ROI to 20% 
Note that installation costs, technical refresh costs, and status quo 
phaseout costs would have to increase by a minimum of 49 percent in order to 
lower the ROI to 20 percent.  It appears that it would take a large cost increase in 
any of those areas to make the project unattractive, which shows that the 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The calculation of a value for ROI of the CANES program is complex and 
depends on many factors.  Any attempt to estimate the overall savings for a 
project as far reaching and long lasting as CANES necessitates making 
assumptions and will therefore include some uncertainties.  The researcher 
made every attempt to use the most up-to-date information and use estimates 
where no data were available to ensure the calculated ROI was reasonable and 
reflected the real value of the CANES program.  These estimates were based on 
the lower bounds of values from case studies that examined benefits that could 
be realized with network consolidation and a SOA environment. 
The calculated ROI value for the CANES program is 73 percent. This 
value, while attractive, is dependent on the U.S. Navy being able to reduce 
manning associated with shipboard network operation.  While this reduction may 
be possible, naval personnel planners will actually need to reduce the IT billets 
required for the savings due to the implementation of CANES to be realized. 
While the ROI is sensitive to manpower reductions, the calculated value is 
relatively insensitive to changes in installation costs, phaseout costs of the status 
quo systems, and costs associated with the planned technical refresh for 
hardware and software on CANES ships.  It would take an increase of 49 percent 
in status quo phaseout costs to reduce the CANES ROI to a minimum acceptable 
value of 20 percent. 
Compared to the ROI value of 95 percent the AoA team calculated, the 
value of 73 percent the researcher calculated may seem low.  However, the AoA 
team used a discount rate of 5 percent, while the researcher used a discount rate 
of 7 percent.  By recalculating the CANES ROI with a 5 percent discount rate, a 
117 percent ROI for CANES is obtained, which is even more attractive than the 
value obtained by the AoA team.  The main reason for the observed difference is 
the net investment for CANES in this thesis is lower due to the lower cost to 
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install CANES on a new ship compared to install the legacy network systems for 
Force Level, Unit Level, and Submarine class ships. 
The numerical ROI value for CANES is important, but it should not be the 
only consideration taken into account when deciding whether to fund the CANES 
program.  The CANES program has several intangible benefits that provide real 
value to the U.S. Navy, but could not be quantified in this thesis.  Examples of 
these benefits are increased network availability, reduction of network space and 
weight, and improved network security management.  These factors, combined 
with the 73 percent ROI, make CANES even more attractive. 
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APPENDIX.  AOA COST ESTIMATES 
 
Table 22.   AoA Status Quo Life Cycle Cost Estimate59 
                                            
59 PEO C4I PMW 160, Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) 
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) Detailed Report (October 31, 2008). 
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Table 23.   AoA C&E Life Cycle Cost Estimate60 
                                            
60 PEO C4I PMW 160, Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) 
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) Detailed Report (October 31, 2008). 
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Table 24.   AoA C&E 2 POR Life Cycle Cost Estimate61 
                                            
61 PEO C4I PMW 160, Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) 
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) Detailed Report (October 31, 2008). 
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Table 25.   AoA C&E 2 Sub-Prog Life Cycle Cost Estimate62 
                                            
62 PEO C4I PMW 160, Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) 
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) Detailed Report (October 31, 2008). 
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